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SHUTTLE II PROGRESS REPORT

Dr. Theodore A. Talay
Aerospace Engineer, Shuttle II Study
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia 23665-5225

for expanding man's activities into the space
frontiers over the next several decades.
Included in these forecasts are manned
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) missions,
lunar and Mars bases, and deployment of large
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) systems.
Attaining such goals will require that space
transportation costs drop to levels far below
those of the present Space Shuttle system or
expendable launch vehicles. Otherwise,
mission planners will be faced with scaling
back activities to stay within anticipated
budget constraints.

ABSTRACT
This paper presents a status report on the
study of a next-generation manned launch
system, or Shuttle II, being conducted at the
NASA Langley Research Center. Underlying
reasons for considering such
system,
including the need for low-cost, safe, and
reliable manned access to space, are
discussed. System and operational
characteristics for such a future vehicle are
presented. Several rocket vehicle conceptual
designs are depicted that satisfy the stated
requirements. The role of advancing
technologies is shown to have a major impact
on the choice of a vehicle concept. For a
near-term technology level, a two-stage rocket
vehicle has been selected for in-depth Shuttle
II studies. The need for fully-reusable
launch systems with radically simpler ground
and flight operations is stated to be critical
in reducing launch costs.

a

Routine, low-cost access to space is a
compelling enough reason for considering a
next-generation space transportation system.
But it is not the only one. Projected demands
for Space Shuttle launch services will impose
maximum allowable flight rates on the system.
Sometime in the post-2000 era, individual
Shuttle vehicles will face wearout and
retirement. The dramatic technological
progress which has occurred in many areas
since the development and deployment of the
Space Shuttle suggests that a new, more
efficient space transportation system replace
the current system. International competition
is also growing in the marketplace in response
to rising launch demands, with many new
transportation systems under study or
development by the Europeans, Japanese,
Chinese, and Soviets. Pressures are building
on the U.S. to face this market competition
with its own launch systems.

INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle represents a major
advancement in the space transportation
capabilities of the United States. Despite
the Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle
has, over many missions, demonstrated itself
~c::t- be a highly versatile vehicle for both
planned and unplanned mission activities.
However, one original goal of the Space
Shuttle system has remained elusive--that of
low-cost space transportation. Because of
budgetary pressures in the development phase,
early fully-reusable Shuttle concepts evolved
into the more labor-intensive partially
reusable system actually produced. As a
result, recurring hardware and operations
costs have proven far higher than expected.

The Langley Research Center has for many years
been actively involved in examining new space
transportation system concepts to fulfill a
variety of anticipated mission needs (ref. 4,
5). Early in 1985, Langley was asked by NASA
Headquarters to initiate preliminary
conceptual studies of a next-generation launch
system called "Shuttle II". Early study
phases were aimed at defining desired system
and operational characteristics of a Shuttle
II system. A main objective of the Shuttle II

Recent civilian and military space launch
requirements studies (ref. 1 ,2) and the report
of the National Commission on Space (ref. 3)
have presented exciting and ambitious options
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line connecting the mixed-fleet approaches in
Figure 1 . An example is a first-stage booster
used in conjunction with either a manned
orbiter element or an unmanned heavy-lift
stage.

program is to demonstrate vehicle concepts
that (a) substantially reduce the cost of
space transportation and (b) provide a
complement to a transportation architecture
that supports a wide range of scientific,
defense, and commercial uses. Progress
reports on this study have appeared earlier in
references 6 and 7.
MISSIONS AND TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE
Planning for a next-generation space
transportation system requires detailed views
of anticipated future space activities.
Mission models for the period 1992-2010 are
available (ref. 1 ,2) for such purposes.
Generally, anticipated missions tend to fall
within two categories. On one hand there is a
need to move large masses--bulk cargo,
propellants, large military and civilian
satellites--to orbit at the lowest possible
cost or "low dollars per pound". But for
priority or sortie types of missions involving
personnel transport, servicing and repair
visits, and movement to orbit and return of
high-valued commercial products and supplies.
a low 11 dollars per flight" approach is a valid
consideration.
As Figure 1 shows, the Space Shuttle was
designed to perform all these space
transportation functions. The Challenger
accident placed new emphasis on assured access
to space with complementary launch systems
emerging such as the Air Force Titan 4 among
other expendables. In the future, however, a
mixed-fleet approach will divide these
functions in a more cost-efficient manner. A
Shuttle II vehicle would fly the priority/
sortie missions. Near-term technology dictates
an all-rocket system, but given time and
technology funding, an air-breathing system,
such as the National Aero-Space Plane, may
emerge as a Shuttle II option. The Langley
Shuttle II study is limited to vertical
takeoff rocket systems. The heavy-lift
functions may be fulfilled initially through
the use of a Shuttle-Derived Vehicle (SDV)
using many of the same components, facilities,
and manpower of the present Space Shuttle
system. Later, more cost-efficient partiallyreusable or fully-reusable launch vehicles may
be phased in to meet anticipated increased
launch demands.

The present study has placed primary Shuttle
II mission emphasis into the three major
categories as shown in Figure 2. The
personnel transport role assumes everincreasing emphasis a& the Space Station
begins operations and~'undergoes growth. Onorbi t servicing is another major role
undertaken by Shuttle II. Not only will there
be a Space Station in orbit, there will also
be many unmanned space platforms and
observatories which will require periodic
maintenance and repair--a task well-suited for
a manned launch vehicle. Space Shuttle crews
have aptly demonstrated these tasks in earlier
missions. In many mixed-fleet approaches, the
heavy-lift vehicle functions only to take
payloads to orbit. But there is also a need
to bring much of this payload mass back from
orbit. This is especially true of high-valued
products manufactured in orbit--for example,
pharmaceuticals and crystals--as well as Space.
Station logistics modules and materials. A
manned Shuttle II also fulfills this role.
While the payload requirements of a Shuttle II
system have not been set, certain "driver" or
baseline missions are being used in this
study. These include 20,000 pounds to a Space
Station operations orbit (262 nautical miles,
28.5 degrees inclination), and 12,000 pounds
to a low sun-synchronous orbit (150 nautical
miles, 98.0 degrees inclination) for servicing
of unmanned polar platforms. The baseline
payload bay size is a 15-foot diameter
cylindrical volume 30-feet in length. It
should be emphasized that these are only
representative study missions. The Shuttle II
study is examining vehicle design sensitivity
to reference mission payloads ranging from
2,500 to 65,000 pounds.
SYSTEM AND OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Understanding the costs of the Space Shuttle
system is a key consideration in evaluating
design options for a replacement system.
Figure 3 examines one aspect--the costs
associated with flying Shuttle missions.
Presently, large costs are incurred in both
the manpower for ground, flight, and
management o·perations and the replacement and
refurbishment of Shuttle hardware. Propellant
costs for each flight are a relatively small
percentage of the total.

Total life-cycle costs (the sum of
development, production, and recurring costs)
for these systems will, no doubt, greatly
influence the timing and appearance of the
particular mixed-fleet systems developed. To
lower total life~cycle costs, the two vehicles
may share common launch sites, operational
facilities, and manpower. And in the "common
element" approach to vehicle architecture,
major launch components may also be shared
between vehicles as indicated by the dashed

In the future, the need is to reduce launch
costs by a large f actor--some say an order-ofmagni tude reduction. The costs of propellants
for a vertical-takeoff rocket system will not
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functions of a labor-intensive mission control
can be eliminated.

change very much. What this implies is the
need for a radically new approach to
operations concepts, making all Shuttle II
system components fully reusable, and flying
the vehicle frequently to amortize the
facility and manpower costs. These are very
difficult objectives. In our study we have
sought to define desired operational and
vehicle characteristics which would lead us
closer to the goal of major cost reductions.

An analogy frequently drawn is that of launch
vehicle operations similar in scope to airline
operations whereby a small ground crew
services and readies an airliner for the next
flight, which is then flown in nearly an
qutonomous mode by a small.flight crew.
Launch vehicles, however, have not yet reached
a state of maturity where such routineness is
likely even in a next-generation system.
Lessons learned from Space Shuttle operations,
however, certainly point the way to changes in
design and operations that would provide a
closer realization of that goal.

Briefly, we foresee a vehicle which need not
have all the capabilities of the present Space
Shuttle. Crew size for Shuttle II would be
limited--two to five depending on mission
type. Maximum duration would be shortened to
three days, but the Shuttle II vehicle would
operate frequently (fly every two weeks) with
a minimum of maintenance and checkout
requirements bet.ween flights and operate under
adverse weather conditions--rain and moderate
winds included. Safety is a major concern.
The Shuttle II vehicle will possess large
performance margins, fault-tolerant
subsystems, and abort capabilities. For
example, the vehicle will be able to reach
orbit even if one engine were to fail at
liftoff. Under worst-case conditions, where
vehicl~ recovery was not possible, the Shuttle
II would have an escape system to permit crew
survival.

TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
The role of technological advancements in
understanding directions.for future launch
systems is a critical issue. Figure 5
demonstrates now the gross lift-off weight of
single- and two-stage vertical-takeoff rocket
systems decrease with advancing technologies.
The technology level parameter represents a
percentage overall dry weight reduction from
the Space Shuttle prior to vehicle resizing.
Our baseline Shuttle II study considers a
vehicle development cycle initiated in the
year 1992 by which time all required
technologies would need to be in place. This
is at about the 25% dry weight reduction
level. Highly advanced technologies,
predicted for the National Aero-Space Plane,
will require more intensive study to make them
a reality. They are indicated as a 60%
overall dry weight reduction over the Space
Shuttle reference.

Innovative design and improved technologies
are needed to reduce the operations labor
force. Major assembly and processing would be
conducted horizontally in low-bay work
facilities. Vehicle/payload integration is an
area which, in particular, lends itself to
significant processing streamlining. Under
present Space Shuttle procedures, an orbiter
will sit in a processing facility while the
entire cargo bay is reconfigured, interface
tests run, and orbiter software changed and
verified for each new mission. The Shuttle II
concept decouples the vehicle and payload
processing and minimizes the interface
requirements as depicted in figure 4. Payload
containment structures may be standardized for
major mission types thus eliminating the need
for major reconfiguration after each flight.
Installation of the container on a vehicle
would take place in the processing facility
with only minimum payload access availability
at the launch pad. The use of tip fins on the
vehicle wing eliminates the need for a large
vertical tail and frees fuselage area for the
payload canister concept.

The figure demonstrates that single-stage-toorbi t (SSTO) rocket vehicles become attractive
only when the technology level achieves the
equivalent of 30% - 40% dry weight reductions.
Thus the defined near-term technology (1992)
level suggests a two-stage rocket vehicle as
the concept of choice. The outlook for
single-stage rocket vehicles improves
dramatically at advanced technology levels
with the overall lift-off weights of both the
single- and two-stage rocket vehicles under a
million pounds. Operational considerations
would then likely dictate the selection of the
single-stage system.
Vehicle dry weight is more closely aligned
with overall development and production costs.
In figure 6, near-term technology levels
suggest selection of a two-stage rocket
system. The logistics of moving a Shuttle II
vehicle about is an important factor in the
selection process. Considering the air-ferry
weight-carrying capabilities of a 747
transport aircraft, it is evident that both
elements of a 1992-technology two-stage system
are ferryable,·whereas the dry weight of the
SSTO makes its ferry capability prohibitive.

The vehicle should also. possess an
automated,self-diagnostic checkout system with
built-in test equipment and modularized
subsytems for easy maintenance to speed
·processing between flights. And, by making
the vehicle as autonomous as possible with
.extensive use of standardized flight software,
robotics, and artificial intelligence, many
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subsystems are located, for easy access, in
the forward nose area and spine fairing.

VEHICLE CONCEPTS
Figure 7 provides a size comparison of the
present Space Shuttle with the design concepts
considered in the Shuttle II 'study. The
single-stage-to-orbit concept using near-term
technology is longer than the current Shuttle
and weighs more. For polar missions, an
augmentation stage must be added. The twostage vehicle, again employing near-term
technologies, is significantly smaller and
lighter. Baselined to perform the polar
mission, it can carry 30,000 pounds to Space
Station orbit. Most dramatic is the effect
of applying advanced technology, as
contemplated for National Aero-Space Plane
use, to rocket vehicles. The SSTO rocket
system is dramatically reduced in size and
weight.

As the orbiter accelerates towards orbital
speed, three of the main.engines are throttled
down and then switched off. Extendable
nozzles on two of the engines are deployed to
maximize engine thrust efficiency.
Figure 1 O depicts the general operational
scenario for this vehicle. Following a
mission, servicing of the vehicle would be
conducted horizontally in a low-bay facility.
Booster, orbiter, and payload container would
be processed in separate areas and brought
together f.or vehi ale integration. The
vehicle's unfueled weight is small enough to
permit horizontal towing to the launch pad. A
nominal ground turnaround time of ten days is
an operational goal for this concept.

Because of the large size and weight
differences between the SSTO and two-stage
concepts at a 1992 level of technology, the
two-stage rocket system has been selected for
further in-depth studies. Figure 8 is a
multi-view of this vehicle. Figure 9 shows
views of the orbiter and booster.

At the launch pad, the vehicle is raised to
the vertical with a strongback system, fueled
and launched.· Pad time is reduced to 24 hours
or less by dictating that nearly all vehicle
preparatory functions occur in the processing
facility. Only minimum vehicle maintenance or
late payload access functions would be
available at the launch pad. Because of
highly volatile weather considerations, a
rolling enclosure is provided for the time the
vehicle is on the launch pad.

The Shuttle II two-stage concept uses dualfuel, parallel-burn propulsion. At lift-off
all engines on the booster and orbiter are
running. The unmanned booster is powered by
six liquid oxygen-hydrocarbon (RP) fuel
engines rated at 250,000 pounds sea-level
thrust. The booster has three propellant
tanks (liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, RP
fuel). Hydrogen and oxygen propellants are
crossfed to the orbiter stage during the boost
phase. Staging occurs at Mach 3 with the
booster gliding back to the launch site. The
low staging Mach number ensures no special
booster thermal protection system requirements
and allows significant performance and
operations ~argins to be added without major
system weight increases.

TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
Certain critical technologies have been
identified as requiring development before a
next-generation vehicle enters its development
cycle. Lightweight primary structures, both
in material properties and methods of
construction, are a driving factor in reducing
the size of the vehicle. Space Shuttle
experience suggests a Shuttle II vehicle have
a thermal protection system (TPS) that is
durable, waterproof, and significantly less
labor-intensive. This would allow flight even
in adverse weather. Reusable, cryogenic
propellant tankage is an enabling technology
for these concepts. In our studies, the
tankage is integral and subject to major
loadings. Yet these tanks must function for
tens, perhaps hundreds of uses. Inspection
procedures for demonstrating tank integrity
are also critical.

The Shuttle II orbiter is propelled by five
liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen engines of
300,000 pounds sea-level thrust each. These
engines are based, in part, on the Space
Shuttle Main Engine. Most of the orbiter body
volume is occupied by the hydrogen and oxygen
propellant tanks. At Mach 3 staging, these
tanks are still full because of the crossfeed
of propellants from the booster.

Reusable hydrocarbon and advanced hydrogen
propulsion require technological development.
In the area of operations, vehicle
technologies related to the use of expert
systems, robotics and artificial intelligence
would decouple the vehicle from a majority of
mission control functions, thus making it
autonomous. Fault-tolerant and self-test
systems are required to maintain the vehicle.

Unlike the Space Shuttle, the orbiter concept
uses a linearized crew module arrangement
along the top of the fuel tanks. The forward
flight compartment, with a crew complement of
up to 5, is positioned such as to allow it to
be rocketed free in an emergency escape.
Behind the flight compartment is a work/sleep
station comparable to the mid-deck of the
Space Shuttle. An internal tunnel, covered by
a fuselage fairing, connects the crew module
to the payload containment structure. Many
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PHASED APPROACH
The Shuttle II concept shown would begin
operations in the post-2000 time period. A
phased approach is being considered for this
system which could also provide a heavy-lift
cargo function. In such a scenario, the
Shuttle II booster and an unmanned parallel
second stage are developed and flight tested
by the late 1990's. The booster, as a
consequence of the low staging Mach number,
can initially be produced with large design
margins, particularly in the area of reusable
cryogenic tankage.
Estimates are that a
second stage, using hydrogen propulsion with
crossfeed from the booster, could.deliver
75,000 to 100,000 pounds to orbit. Initially
the second stage might be entirely expendable,
but later the propulsion and avionics package
may be recovered from orbit for reuse.
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mixed-fleet architecture approach to space
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SPACE TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURE
OPTIONS

Time
Technology

Need
Priority/Sortie
Missions

~

~

~Shuttlell

I

• Low $/flight
•Low $/lb

"0,

I

Cargo Missions

I

I

',
',

·Low $/lb

Complementary

Figure 1.- Space transportation architecture options based on mission requirements.

SHUTTLE II MISSIONS
• People transport
• Manned access to space station
• Man-critical missions
• Rescue
• Manned exploration
• Public access to space
•, Servicing
• Space station
• Co-orbiting platforms
• Polar platforms
• Commercial platforms
• Observatories
• Other
• Launch and recovery
• Small payloads
• Commercial products return to Earth
• Other down payloads

Figure 2.- Priority/sortie missions for a Shuttle II vehicle.
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RECURRING COSTS
SHUTTLE (STS)

SHUTTLE II

Propellants
4%

Hardware
(refurbish,
replace)
Hardware
(includes
expendables)
51%

Operations
45%
Goal: Reduce recurring
costs to a fraction
of those of STS
Inferences: Full reusability
Simple operations

Figure 3.- Reducing recurring costs of flying Shuttle missions.
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DETACHABLE PAYLOAD CONTAINER SYSTEM

Deployment

Servicing
• Offline processing
• Standardized payload
interfaces
• Specialized container
systems for dominant
mission types

Personnel Transport

• User access until
installation at
launch pad

Delivery

Figure 4.- Containerized payload concept for streamlining ground operations.
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TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON
VERTICAL TAKE-OFF ROCKET VEHICLES
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Figure· 5 .- Effects of technology advancements on gross lift-off weight (GLOW)
of rocket vehicles.
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TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON
VERTICAL TAKE-OFF ROCKET VEHICLES
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Figure 6.- Effects of technology advancements on dry weights of rocket vehicles.
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SHUTTLE II CONCEPTS COMPARED
TO SPACE SHUTTLE
• Shutlle 11 carries 20 Klb
• Payload Bay 15' x 30'

Space
Shuttle

Single Stage
(SSTO)
Near-Term
Technology

Two-Stage
Near-Term
Technology

Single-Stage
(SSTO)
Advanced
Technology

Figure 7 .- Several Shuttle II design concepts compared to the Space Shuttle.
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SHUTTLE II TWO-STAGE CONCEPT

110 ft
• 1992 Technology level
• Integral tanks
• RP booster; Mach 3 staging glideback
• LOX/LH2 orbiter
• Payload: 12 Klb Polar .
• Gross Weight: 2,036 Klb
• Dry weight: 266 Klb

Figu~e

8.- The Shuttle II baseline two-stage rocket vehicle.

7-13

ORBITER

'Length: 138 ft
Dry weight: 181 Klb
GLOW: 1164 Klb

BOOSTER

Length: 106 ft
Dry weight: 85 Klb
GLOW: 872 Klb

Figure 9.- Views of the Shuttle II orbiter and booster.
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SHUTTLE II OPERATIONAL SCENARIO

!!----=SERVICE

SAFE

SERVICE

MATE

LAUNCH
Erect

Multiple bays

Figure 10.- General operational scenario for a Shuttle II vehicle.
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